ESSAY
FORMALITIES AND FORMALISM IN THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
BRUCE H. MANNt

"Down with formalism" has been the rallying cry of probate
reform since 1975, whenJohn H. Langbein published his landmark
critique of formalism in wills adjudication.' Thus, when Langbein
himself announced that "curing intent-defeating formalism"2 was a
driving force behind recent revisions of the Uniform Probate Code,
commentators naturally hailed the "fall of formalism."' Without
question, portions of the new Code further the weakening of
formalism that has characterized many areas of law in the second
half of the twentieth century. A more accurate description of the
new Code, however, would refer instead to the rather less stirring
"fall of formalities," as it is the formal requirements for wills that
have been most affected. Formalism itself still flourishes in the
revised Code. Indeed, the new and, in many respects, improved
Uniform Probate Code illustrates the enduring and perhaps
inescapable tension over the role of formalism in private law
adjudication-a subject that has occupied scholars as diverse as
Roscoe Pound and Duncan Kennedy.'

t Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful toJohn
H. Langbein and Lawrence W. Waggoner for their generous comments and criticisms.
Errors or differences that remain do so despite their best efforts. Locke R. McMurray
rendered excellent research assistance.
' SeeJohn H. Langbein, SubstantialCompliancewith the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv.
489 (1975).
2
John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous
Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 873-74 (1992).
Langbein is a member of the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code,
which oversaw the revisions. Waggoner is Director of Research and Chief Reporter
of the Joint Editorial Board and Reporter for the revised Article II of the Code. The
Prefatory Note to the revised Article H also mentions the importance of "intentserving policies" in place of formalism. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. H prefatory note
(1990).
'See, e.g., James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1010
(1992) (claiming the 1990 Uniform Probate Code reduces reliance on formalities and
increases reliance on intent).
4
See Roscoe Pound, The Theory ofJudicialDecision, 111,36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 94752 (1923) (recognizing the tension between the just result and the legal result, and
(1033)
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This Essay explores that tension. It examines the revisions to

the law of wills proposed by the Uniform Probate Code and asks
whether the formalism that the drafters wish to "cure" is an
"anguished, pedantic cult of symbols wholly worthless and meaningless in themselves," 5 "the effort to make sense of the lawyer's
perception of an intelligible order,"' or simply "the extreme and
therefore unfortunate manifestation of a fundamentally desirable
characteristic." 7 It suggests that the character of formalism derives
from our collective judgment of what it accomplishes in different
settings, and that its utility is similarly contingent on context. This
Essay joins the long-standing discussion of formalism by Lon Fuller,
Duncan Kennedy, Carol Rose, Frederick Schauer, Ernest Weinrib,
and others, but from the bottom up, as it were-from the perspective of a body of law that, while perhaps low in raw intellectual sex
appeal, nonetheless touches everyone who dies.'

arguingjustice should be ajudge's first concern before that of applying a rigid law);
see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form andSubstance] (examining the conflicts
and similarities in the use of formalism and ad hoc decision-making in contract law);
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Legal Formality] (discussing the liberal theory of justice in terms of the model of
formality). Kennedy recognized the commonality of interest and described Pound's
article as "the first self-conscious general statement of principles for the choice of
form, at least by an American." Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra, at 1702.

5 2 RUDOLPH VONJHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTs AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN
STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 478-79 (1883), quoted in Kennedy, LegalFormality,supra

note 4, at 354-55.
6 ErnestJ. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949, 951 (1988).
' Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 548 (1988).
8 The leading contributions to the discussion are Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941) (examining the policies behind legal formalities
with respect to the common-law doctrine of consideration); Kennedy, Form and
Substance,supra note 4; Kennedy, Legal Formality,supranote 4; Carol M. Rose, Crystals
andMud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (describing the transformation
of "hard-edged" rules in property law into "muddied" doctrines); Schauer, supranote
7 (discussing the meaning of formalism and urging a rethinking of contemporary
aversion to formalism); and Weinrib, supra note 6. Other important participants
include Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Rules, andthe Interpretationof Written Documents,
59 Nw. U. L. REv. 751 (1965) (focusing on rules relating to the interpretation of
written documents, Friedman shows the relationship between the social and historical
forces at work on legal rules); and Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (arguing that the precision
of the rule determines the economic efficiency of the legal process).
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I. FoRMALrTIES AND REFORM
The centerpiece of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code is the most
significant change in what constitutes a will since enactment of the
Statute of Frauds in 1677. For over three hundred years, wills have
been defined by their formal qualities. The details have varied, but
the essential formal requirements-writing, signature, and attestation-have remained constant and inviolate. These three formal
requirements remain in a modified § 2-502, but they are no longer
essential. Indeed, one could say that they remain in form only. A
new provision, § 2-503, permits a court to dispense with the
formalities if it is satisfied "that the decedent intended the docu-

ment ...

to constitute" his or her will.'
The significance of this change cannot be overstated. Wills have

always been creatures of form rather than substance. A document
that meets the formal requirements of the applicable Wills Act is a
will. Whether or not a decedent intended a formally executed
document to be his or her will has always been secondary to

whether or not the document complied with the statutory formalities. Indeed, the issue of testamentary intent arises only when
someone contesting the will questions whether the testator had
sufficient mental capacity to make a will in the first place. Barring
a contest, courts infer intent from compliance with form. Section

9 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990). This section, Writings Intended as Wills, is
worth quoting in full:
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with Section 2-502, the document or writing is
treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute
(i) the decedents will, (ii) a partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii)
an addition to or an alteration of the will, or (iv) a partial or complete
revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion
of the will.
Id.
A critical adjunct to § 2-503 is § 2-502(c), which provides that "[i]ntent that the
document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence." Id.
§ 2-502(c) (1990). This is the first time extrinsic evidence has been accepted to
establish or interpret formally executed wills outside of the narrow area of resolving
patent ambiguities. For the sake of simplicity, references in this Essay to the
dispensing power of § 2-503 will include the authorization of extrinsic evidence in
§ 2-502(c) that gives teeth to § 2-503.
The 1991 text of the Uniform Probate Code incorporates minor changes that do
not alter any of the sections discussed in this Essay. As my subject is the 1990
revisions, I will cite to the 1990 text to avoid confusion.
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2-503, however, makes the testator's intent paramount and, more to
the point, independent of form.
Section 2-503 is the most recent salvo in a long campaign against
formalism in wills adjudication, the roots of which go back over fifty
years."° It is important to remember that the target of the campaign has always been formalism rather than the formalities
themselves. The statutory requirements for formal wills serve useful
ends. They take the vast array of testamentary things and channel
them into a form that is readily recognizable as a will, thus easing
the transfer of property at death. By imposing a standard form on
testamentary writings, they enable probate courts to identify
documents as wills solely on the basis of readily ascertainable formal
criteria, thereby permitting probate to proceed
in the vast majority
11
of cases as a routine, bureaucratic process.
The problem lies not with the formalities, but with judicial
insistence on literal compliance with them. Was one of the attesting
witnesses called from the room while the testator was in midsignature? If so, the will is invalid because it was not signed in the
presence of both witnesses. 12 Did the witnesses sign separately, the
first one passing the second on the way out of the room? If so, the
will is invalid because the witnesses did not sign in each other's
presence." Did the attorney omit the attestation clause, although
the witnesses signed a self-proving affidavit that they thought was an
attestation clause, that looked like an attestation clause, and that
was where the attestation clause would have been? If so, the will is
invalid because not attested. 4 Courts have routinely invalidated
wills for minor defects in form even in uncontested cases and
sometimes even while conceding-always ruefully, of course-that the
document clearly represents the wishes and intent of the testator.
" The earliest criticisms were Ashbel G. Gulliver & CatherineJ. Tilson, Classification of GratuitousTransfers,51 YALE LJ. 1, 3 (1941) (formal requirements "should not
be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intent"); and
Philip Mechem, Why Not a Modem Wills Act? A Comment on the Wills Provisionsof the
Model Probate Code, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 504 (1948) (claiming the Model Probate
Code's "imposition of further formalities is likely to imperil meritorious wills"). The
campaign languished, however, until Langbein took up the cause. See Langbein, supra
note 1.
1 See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 367-68; Fuller, supra note 8, at 801-03;
Langbein, supra note 1, at 493-94.
"See In re Colling, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1440, 1442-43 (Eng. Ch.).
"See In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733, 737-79 (Eng. P.).
See Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983).
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This judicial rule of strict compliance with Wills Act formalities is
what led Langbein to begin his call for reform with the charge that
"[t]he law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relentless formal" 15
ism.
Langbein rested his call on the proposition that "[tihe first
principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation."16 The
principle that people should be able to devise their property as they
wish, although deeply rooted in the common law, has always
described an ideal rather than reality. Like its inter vivos cognate,
"a man's home is his castle," it evokes images of independence and
individualism derived from ownership of private property. In
reality, of course, the autonomy of private property owners is
sharply circumscribed-in life and in death. For the living, there are
zoning rules, building codes, nuisance laws, environmental regulations; for the dead, there are estate taxes, homestead and family
maintenance allowances, forced shares for surviving spouses and
sometimes children-all reflecting political decisions to constrain
private property in favor of some superseding value. All these
limitations notwithstanding, courts and commentators alike make
obeisance to free testation. The practical consequence of this
deference is that the many rules that govern what constitutes a will
and how it should be construed all purport to promote discovery of
what the dearly departed intended.
Rules, however, sometimes assume lives of their own, particularly in bureaucratic systems such as probate. When they do-when
courts refuse to countenance even minor slips in compliance-the
administrative convenience of the formalities becomes the slavish
adherence to form of formalism. Langbein offered an escape from
the formalistic bind of strict compliance. He argued that the
formalities are legitimate only insofar as they signify that functions
deemed essential to the process have been fulfilled. Compliance
with the formalities allows one to infer performance of the
functions."
If the formalities derive their meaning from the
functions they serve, then, Langbein argued, courts should not
stand on formality, but should instead accept substantial compliance
'"Langbein,

18

supra note 1, at 489.

Id. at 491.

17 See id. at 491-98 (discussing four functions served by compliance with
formalities). Langbein drew on Fuller, supranote 8, at 800-04, and Gulliver & Tilson,
supranote 10, at 5-13. The functions the formalities serve are variously identified as
evidentiary, channeling, cautionary or ritual, and protective.
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with the formalities whenever they are satisfied that the document
expresses the testator's intent and that its form, however imprecise,
gives sufficient assurance that the purposes of the formalities have
been served.
Langbein's proposal quickly became a staple of the reform literature."8 It did not, however, sweep the courts. Court after court
refused to apply substantial compliance to save defectively executed
wills, sometimes saying that to do so "would lead to confusion and
uncertainty" 19 or "unsettle the probate process," 2 but more often
rejecting it with little or no comment. 2' Their refusal was so
persistent that by the time a court bucked the trend and applied the
doctrine, 22 Langbein himself had switched his allegiance to the
related solution that became § 2-503.2s
The "dispensing power" of § 2-503 did not originate with the
'a See e.g.,James Lindgren, Abolishing the AttestationRequirementfor Wills, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 541, 544 (1990) ("The question ... is whether the formality promotes the
primary goal of our system of testation-effectuating the intent of the testator....");
Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalismin Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH.
U. L.Q. 39, 49 (1985) (questioning Texas courts' invalidation of wills for failure of
formal requirements where "there was little or no question that the testator had
intended the instrument to be a will");J.K. Maxton, Execution of Wills: The Formalities
Considered, 1 CANTERBuRY L. REv. 393 (1982);J.G. Miller, SubstantialCompliance and
the Execution of Wills, 36 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 559, 564-66 (1987) (discussing
Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine); Charles I. Nelson &Jeanne M. Starck,
Formalitiesand Formalism: A CriticalLook at the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REv. 331,
355 (1979) ("There is something inherently fair about [Langbein's] approach which
says that formalities are important but they are a tool and not a sword."). Langbein's
proposal also earned him the title, which I am not sure I would describe as an
honorific, of the "current 'dean' of the so-called 'functional school.'" C. Douglas
Miller, Will Formality,JudicialFormalism,and LegislativeReform: An Examinationof the
New Uniform ProbateCode 'HarmlessError"Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism,
43 FLA. L. REv. 599, 604 (1991).
19 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
o In re Estate of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1015 (N.J. 1987).
21 See Flagle v. Martinelli, 360 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that
"the decedent's purported will... does not approach even substantial compliance");
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 166 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that even
if the court "were to adopt a standard of substantial compliance" the will in question
would be invalid).
' See In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1345 (N.J. 1991) (holding that will in
which witnesses signed only the self-proving affidavit may still be in substantial
compliance with formal attestation requirement in some circumstances). One earlier
case applied substantial compliance to validate a defectively signed will, Estate of
Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123, 129-31, 136 (Orphans' Ct. 1981), but was settled before
this departure could be tested by appellate review. SeeJohn H. Langbein, Excusing
HarmlessErrorsin the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia'sTranquil Revolution in
ProbateLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 n.27 (1987).
2- See Langbein, supra note 22, at 51-54.
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Uniform Probate Code. While Langbein sought converts in the
United States, two Australian states reformed their Wills Acts. One,
Queensland, adopted Langbein's substantial compliance proposal.24 The other, South Australia, provided that documents that had
not been executed with the requisite formalities could nonetheless
be admitted to probate whenever the court was satisfied "that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the
document to constitute his will."25 The Queensland statute, in
Langbein's words, "has been a flop," 26 primarily because of judges
who seem unable to relinquish the old certitude of literal compliance. 27 The South Australia statute, on the other hand, has been
a rousing success. Courts have applied it with impressive discrimination and liberality to admit formally noncomplying documents as
wills. Other jurisdictions in Australia and Canada, and now the
Uniform Probate Code, have copied it.28 Joining the train, which
is still very much in the station, the American Law Institute has
29
added its endorsement.
24 See Queensland Succession Act of 1981, § 9(a), Queensl. Stat. No. 69.

2 Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2), 1975, § 9, S. AusTL. STAT. 366, 367
(amending Wills Act, 1936-1975, § 12(2), 8 S. AusTL. STAT. 665).
26 Langbein, supra note 22, at 1.
27 For Langbein's criticism of the application of the statute, see Langbein, supra
note2 22, at 41-45.
' Langbein has analyzed the South Australia statute and the cases interpreting it
in detail. See id. at 8-41. The few voices expressing reservations about the statute
appear to have been ignored. See, e.g., William F. Ormiston, Formalitiesand Wills: A
Pleafor Caution, 54 AUSTL. LJ. 451, 452-57 (1980) (arguing that the "formalities" of
wills serve valid and necessary purposes and courts should be reluctant to allow
substantial compliance to be sufficient); Simon N.L. Palk, Informal Wills: FromSoldiers
to Citizens, 5 ADEL. L. REv. 382, 396-401 (1976) (discussing the likely evidentiary
problems of allowing courts to dispense with formal requirements and look to indicia
of testamentary intent). For a discussion of the spread of the South Australia
harmless error rule to other Australian states and Manitoba, see Langbein, supra note
22, at 45-48. The principal modification in the Uniform Probate Code version is one
for which Langbein argued-that the decedent's intent be established by "clear and
convincing evidence" rather than by a standard of "no reasonable doubt." Compare
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990) with Wills Act § 12(2); see also Langbein, supra note
22, at 34-37 (discussing the standard of proof under § 12(2) of the Wills Act).
Langbein's proposal echoes an earlier suggestion that plaintiffs in contract actions be
permitted to prove the existence of an agreement within the Statute of Frauds by
clear and convincing evidence rather than deciding the dispute by determining
whether the writing itself meets the formal requirements of the Statute. SeeJoseph
M. Perillo, The Statute of Fraudsin the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 74-77 (1974).
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 33.1 cmt. g
(1990). Referring to the Australian reforms and to § 2-503, comment g urges
legislative adoption of "a rule that excuses harmless errors in the execution of a will,"
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The dispensing power operates more directly than substantial
compliance. It forgoes the functional analysis of the latter and
instead allows the proponent of a purported will to prove what
courts now infer from compliance with the formalities-that the
decedent intended the document to be a will. It thus redresses the
evidentiary imbalance of the traditional rule-that compliance with
the formalities raises a rebuttable presumption that the document
is a will, while failure to comply creates a conclusive presumption
that it is not-by treating both presumptions as rebuttable. The
degree of compliance with the formalities may still be relevant, but
only insofar as it bears on the decedent's intent, not on how closely
it approximates full compliance. By subordinating the formalities
and their functions to the testator's intent, the dispensing power
frees courts from the fiction that the formalities are of equal weight
and importance. As a consequence, courts can treat minor defects
in execution as just that-minor defects that need not invalidate a
will. With the dispensing power, wills would not be admitted to
probate any less routinely than they are now. The important
difference is that they could not be rejected as routinely.
The dispensing power also restores a measure of candor to the
process of determining the formal sufficiency of testamentary
writings. There has always been a hierarchy of formalities, which
0
courts refuse to admit. Writing, for example, is indispensable.3
The testator's signature is also essential, but courts sometimes fudge
what they will accept as a signature and where on the document it
may appear.3 ' They are more liberal in what they will consider

or, failing that,judicial application of Langbein's substantial compliance doctrine. Id.
" The one exception, nuncupative wills, is tightly limited by various restrictions,
one of which is that they must be reduced to writing within a short period of time.
With regard to the requirement of Uniform Probate Code § 2-502(a)(1) that a will be
"in writing," the comment states that "[amny reasonably permanent record is
sufficient," while citing a Wyoming case, Estate of Reed v. Holsledt, 672 P.2d 829, 833
(Wyo. 1983), that a tape-recorded will is not "in writing." Id. Indiana does permit
videotapes of the execution ceremony to be admitted "as evidence of the proper
execution of a will," but does not go so far as to accept videotape as the will itself.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (West Supp. 1993). For arguments that videotaped
wills should be accepted as "in writing"-a prospect that any good traditionalist finds
repugnant-see Gerry W. Beyer & William R. Bucdey, Videotape and the ProbateProcess:
The Nexus Grows, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 43, 49-61 (1989); William R. Buckley & Alfred W.
Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontierin EstatePlanning,11 OHIO N.U. L. REv.
271,278-80 (1984). For a more modern, or at least more modish, view of nonprinted
texts, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 509,
540-42 (1992).
31See, e.g., Clark v. National Bank of Commerce, 802 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Ark. 1991)
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32
attestation, particularly in terms of what constitutes "presence."
Yet whenever courts stretch the definitions of signature and
attestation, they always maintain that the variant they are accepting
is compliance-not the functional equivalent, but actual compliance.
Although often false, this stance is the only way that courts can
soften the impact of a rule of strict compliance with every formality.
The dispensing power eliminates the need for dissembling by
interposing a notion of "harmless error" as a buffer between
defective execution and intestacy.
The dispensing power of § 2-503 clearly has the potential to
herald the fall of formalism in wills adjudication.3 3 Some commentators note this with trepidation, others with glee. 4 Without
question, simply by permitting courts to look outside the will for
evidence of the testator's intent, § 2-503 weakens the grip of
formalism. Nevertheless, the greatest contribution of the reform is
to the fall of formalities, or, more accurately, to the fall, or at least
decline, of a formality-a more modest, but still significant,
contribution.
Attestation is the formal requirement that distinguishes wills
from all other documents that transfer property-trusts, deeds,
contracts, checks, insurance, pensions, and the like. It is also the
formal requirement that is most complex, least intuitively obvious,

(deeming testator's signature to be at end although followed by nontestamentary
language).
.2 See e.g., Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38,43 (1904) (finding will valid even if signed
"for some possible purpose as a certificate"); Payne v. Payne, 16 S.W. 1, 1 (Ark. 1891)
(holding that the form of attestation is "immaterial"); Madden v. Cornett, 160 S.W.2d
607, 610 (Ky. 1942) (stating that the fact that witness attached more writing than
necessary did not invalidate his signature); Merrill v. Boal, 132 A. 721,724 (R.I. 1926)
(holding that witness's having signed as notary public did not affect validity of
signature); Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159,161 (1885) (finding will valid where clerk
of court attached official certificate to signature); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d
346,353 (Va. 1948) (holding that notary public, regardless of self-perception of role,
signed name as witness to will).
'3 The word "potential" must be emphasized. The provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code are, of course, merely hortatory until enacted by state legislatures. To
date, only two states, Montana and New Mexico, have enacted the revised Article II,
and only Montana included § 2-503 in its enactment. See Act of Apr. 23, 1993, ch.
494, 1993 Mont. Laws ("An Act generally revising the law concerning estates, wills,
and donative transfers..."); Act of Apr. 3, 1993, ch. 174, 1993 N.M. Laws 1554, 1554
("An Act relating to probate; amending, repealing, enacting, recompiling and
reserving sections of the Uniform Probate Code").
' See Lydia A. Clougherty, Note, An Analysis ofthe NationalAdvisoy Committee on
Uniform State Laws' Recommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J.
283, 302 (1991) (expressing trepidation); see also Lindgren, supra note 3, at 1030-32
(expressing glee).
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and, consequently, easiest to violate. Not surprisingly, more wills
are tossed from probate for defective attestation than for any other
reason. Yet, by any functional analysis, attestation contributes little
to the overall objective of assuring that the document represents the
testator's intent.
The traditional justification for attestation is not an evidentiary
one related to the substance of the will. Rather, it is that the
presence of disinterested witnesses at the execution ceremony
guards the testator against various nefarious acts, such as fraud or
undue influence. 5 In reality, attesting witnesses tend to be either
family members, who are well-placed to commit the acts they are
supposed to prevent, or comparative strangers in a lawyer's office
or bank who sign when and where they are told and hardly see
themselves as the testator's sentinels.
The fecklessness of attestation as a protective device is demonstrated by the routine acceptance of will substitutes-life insurance,
pension accounts,joint accounts, and revocable trusts-which do not
even contemplate attestation, and by the twenty-six states that
accept holographic wills. Holographs, by definition, are unattested.
Where allowed, they represent a legislative judgment that attestation
is unnecessary, at least when the document meets other requirements-typically, that the instrument be handwritten, signed, and
sometimes dated, by the testator. The key inquiry in virtually all
holograph litigation is whether the testator wrote the document with
testamentary intent. As a result, courts routinely inquire into the
testator's intent in holographic wills, where there is no attestation,
while they refuse to make the same inquiry into formal wills where
there is substantively adequate, but formally imperfect, attestation.
It is thus depressingly common to see courts within the same
jurisdiction accept ludicrously informal writings as valid holographs
while automatically rejecting elaborate wills drafted by attorneys and
signed in formal execution ceremonies where the testator or
36
witnesses happened to sign in the wrong place or in the wrong order.

" For discussions of the protective function of attestation, see Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 10, at 9-13; Langbein, supra note 1, at 496-97.

' Compare In re Button's Estate, 287 P. 964, 966 (Cal. 1930) (accepting rambling
suicide note to ex-husband as holographic will) with Estate of Johnson v. Jackson
Hosps., 320 P.2d 563, 566 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (rejecting will where testator
failed to declare to witnesses that instrument they signed was his will); compare In re
Kimmel's Estate, 123 A. 405, 406 (Pa. 1924) (accepting as holographic will chatty
letter in which 30 words of 255 made testamentary noises) with In re Estate of Weiss,
279 A.2d 189, 192 (Pa. 1971) (rejecting will where testator signed in the margin).
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All this makes attestation, as the formality that most often
defeats the testator's intent, the most likely subject of the curative
influence of the dispensing power.8 7 And, indeed, attestation
comprises the largest category of formal defects cleansed by the
South Australia act.8 8 This is not to suggest that the dispensing
power should forgive all defects in attestation with equal alacrity.
After all, the absence of attesting witnesses raises different and
rather larger evidentiary questions about the testator's intent than
do trivial failures of presence. What it does suggest is that, under
§ 2-503, attestation will be treated as the weak formality it is.
Although clearly the most dramatic, § 2-503 is not the only
revision to the Uniform Probate Code designed to cure "intentdefeating formalism." Holographic wills, for example, as noted
above, have few formal requirements. Yet courts typically trip over
them in the one situation in which the testator's intent is comparatively clear-where the document offered for probate is an unattested printed will form filled in and signed by the testator in his or her
writing. The requirement that holographs be in the testator's
handwriting sometimes has to contend with the troublesome
presence of printed or typewritten matter on the document. When
that happens, courts apply various rules to construe away the
printed material and determine if what remains is a will by asking:
Are the "material provisions" in the testator's handwriting, is the
printed matter "mere surplusage," or did the testator "intend to
incorporate" the printed portions into the handwritten provisions?3 9

s Others have argued that the failures and weaknesses recounted in the text make
an even better case for abolishing the attestation requirement altogether. See
Lindgren, supra note 18, at 542-43.
" Langbein counted 46 applications of the § 12(2) dispensing power in 41 cases
in South Australia. Twenty-three of the applications involved attestation defects, 11
involved testators' misplaced or missing signatures, and 12 involved alterations to the
will. See Langbein, supra note 22, at 15 n.55.
" See e.g., Estate ofJohnson v.Johnson, 630 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
(not accepting an unattested printed will form for probate because material provisions
not entirely in testator's handwriting); In re Thorn's Estate, 192 P. 19, 22 (Cal. 1920)
(invalidating handwritten will because testator intended to incorporate name of
property inserted with rubber stamp); In re Durlewanger's Estate, 107 P.2d 477,478,
480-81 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (holding that where testator wrote the date "May 3,
_38" surrounding the printed number "19," there was no evidence that the testator
intended to incorporate the printed number as part of the date); In re Lowrance's
Will, 155 S.E. 876, 878 (N.C. 1930) (striking printed words as surplusage and
admitting the will to probate if handwritten remainder clearly expresses decedent's
testamentaryintent). See generally Gail B. Bird, Sleight ofHandwriting: The Holographic
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Because of the comparative informality, not to mention the
sheer quirkiness, of some of the writings offered for probate as
holographic wills, the key inquiry in holograph litigation is whether
the testator wrote the document with testamentary intent. Where
the document is a printed will form, the best evidence of testamentary intent is the printed form itself-the very material that courts
must construe away in the name of form. In the spirit of § 2-503,
a new provision, § 2-502(c), recognizes this by providing that
printed portions of the document can be used to establish that the
testator intended the document to be his or her will.4"
The
"material portions" of the document must still be in the testator's
handwriting,4 1 but even that minimal requirement seems unnecessary when the printed matter in question is the formulaic-and
testamentary-language of a printed form will and, more particularly, when a wholly printed document signed by the testator but not
attested can be admitted under § 2-503.42
Other portions of § 2-502 that govern the execution of witnessed
wills loosen the formalities, but have little to do with formalism, at
least formalism of the "intent-defeating" kind.
One provision
codifies a test that has not been in serious doubt for many decadesthe so-called "conscious presence" test, which permits someone else
to sign for the testator in the testator's presence, even if the testator
cannot see the person, as long as the testator is aware of the
person's presence.43 Another provision permits the witnesses to
sign the will "within a reasonable time after... witness[ing] either
the [testator's] signing of the will . . . or the testator's acknowledg-

Will in Calfornia,32 HASTINGS LJ. 605, 633 (1981) (arguing for adoption of § 2-503
to alleviate problems of holographs); Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and
Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 159, 171-79 (1988)
(arguing against a formalistic approach to interpreting holographic wills).
o Uniform Probate Code § 2-502(c) also permits extrinsic evidence to establish
testamentary intent, thereby abandoning the hoary "four-corners" rule that required
the testator's intent to be determined within the four corners of the document-a rule
that, in any event, was more a statement of an ideal.
41 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (1990).
' One reason for maintaining the "material portions" requirement for holographs
is that wills proven under § 2-503 must meet a higher standard of proof than those
offered under § 2-502. This distinction rests on the functionalist assumption that the
additional handwriting contained in the "material portions" is of sufficient evidentiary
value to merit a lower evidentiary standard.
43 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(2) (1990). For more on the conscious presence
test, see Verner F. Chaffin, Execution, Revocation, and Revalidation of Wills: A Critique
of Existing Statutory Formalities, 11 GA. L. REV. 297, 318-22 (1977).
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ment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will."44 A
"reasonable time" might even include not signing until after the
testator dies.

45

Another revision involves fighting formalism with form. Selfproving affidavits facilitate probate by creating sworn evidence of
due execution. The testator and witnesses simply sign an affidavit
declaring, in effect, that they executed the will in compliance with
the requisite formalities-that is, that they affixed their signatures to
the will in the manner prescribed. The affidavits permit wills to be
admitted to probate without the burdensome inefficiency of
summoning the attesting witnesses to reaffirm what they swore to
in the affidavit and attested to in the attestation clause. As
evidentiary devices, self-proving affidavits are elegantly simple-so
much so that it may be malpractice for lawyers to draft wills without
them. 46
Sometimes, however, execution goes awry, and the
testator or witnesses sign only the self-proving affidavit rather than
the will or attestation clause. Given that self-proving affidavits
closely resemble attestation clauses and are typically executed with
the will and attached to it, there is scant reason not to accept the
signatures to them as sufficient attestation. A perverse line of cases
in Texas, however, held otherwise, until recently reversed by
statute.47 Spurred by the sorry example of Texas, the revised
§ 2-502(a)(3) (1990).
"The comment to § 2-502 states: "[t]here is ... no requirement that the
witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time
requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death."
Id. § 2-502 cmt. Currently, even states that allow witnesses considerable latitude in
when they can sign nonetheless require them to do so before the testator dies. See
In re Estate of Royal, 826 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Colo. 1992); In re Estate of Mikeska, 362
N.W.2d 906, 910-11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); In re Estate of Flicker, 339 N.W.2d 914,
915 (Neb. 1983); Rogers v. Rogers, 691 P.2d 114, 115 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), review
denied, 695 P.2d 1371 (Or. 1985). The NewJersey Supreme Court declined to accept
a will that the witnesses had signed after the testator's death because too much time
had elapsed, but conceded that "[t]here may indeed be cases in which the affixation
of witnesses' signatures after the testator's death would be reasonable." In re Estate
of Peters, 526 A.2d 1005, 1013 (N.J. 1987).
' See Texas State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 360, reprintedin 35 TEX.
B.J. 408, 408 (1972) ("An attorney preparing a will may be subject to criticism, but
not discipline for not having used a self-proving affidavit on the will.").
"' See Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Tex. 1985); Wich v. Fleming, 652
S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. 1983); Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729-30 (Tex. 1966);
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Shriners Hosps. for
Crippled Children v. St.Jude's Children's Research Hosp., Inc., 629 S.W.2d 767, 767
(Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Rodgers v. Estate of King, 614 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981); Jones v. Jones, 630 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); In re Estate of
McDougal, 552 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); McLeroy v. Douthit, 535
4UNIF. PROB. CODE
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Uniform Probate Code stipulates that "[a] signature affixed to a selfproving affidavit attached to a will is considered a signature affixed
48
to the will, if necessary to prove the will's due execution,"
thereby defining a formality with sufficient particularity to avert
formalistic excess.
II.

FORMALISM AND WILLS

The many references to "intent-defeating formalism" in the
Code and commentary can easily lead one to overlook some basic
questions: What does "formalism" mean in the context of wills
adjudication? Do the reforms diminish it? If they do, is that good,
bad, or indifferent?
The first thing one notices about formalism in the wills
literature is that the word rarely appears unadorned. Formalism is
"harsh and relentless," 49 "insistent,"5 0 "unthinking,"51 "excessive."52 As Ernest Weinrib observed, "[flormalism is like a heresy
driven underground, whose tenets must be surmised from the
derogatory comments of its detractors.""3 When critics rail against
formalism in wills adjudication, they have in mind neither the Wills
Act formalities nor rules in general, but rules about the formalitiesspecifically, the rules mandating strict compliance and the intolerance of minor errors.
The result is a rather narrow view of
formalism that sees it as pertaining only to the initial determination
of whether a document is a will and not to the more difficult
question of how the document, once validated as a will, should be
interpreted.
Our understanding of formalism in wills will be
enhanced if we reach beyond that narrow view and broaden our

S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), writ refused, 539 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. 1976); In
re Estate of Pettingill, 508 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Cooper v.
Liverman, 406 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); McGrew v. Bartlett, 387
S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). Texas revised its wills statute in 1991 to
say that "[a] signature on a self-proving affidavit is considered a signature to the will
if necessary to prove that the will was signed by the testator or witnesses." TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(b) (West 1993). For a full discussion and critique, see Mann,
supra note 18.
48 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504(c) (1990). The Code does not require the use of selfproving affidavits, but, as noted, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, it is bad
form for lawyers not to use them.
"' Langbein, supra note 1, at 489.
50 Id.
51Mann, supra note 18, at 49.
52 Id. at 67.
" Weinrib, supra note 6, at 950.

1994]

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

1047

perspective.
Definitions of formalism abound, 4 but the one that is most
useful in the wills context takes as its point of departure the
interplay between rules and standards that Duncan Kennedy
discussed in a pair of influential articles.5 5 When Kennedy argued
that "[f]ormality consists in the attempt to accomplish substantively
rational results ... through the substantively rational formulation
and mechanical application of rules rather than directly through
substantively rational decision processes,"" he was, in effect,
describing the functional justification for formalities articulated by
Fuller, Gulliver and Tilson, and Langbein, with a dollop of Max
Weber's framework of formal and substantive rationality to identify
the nature of the decision-making process.5 7 Rules are thus the
formal realization of standards-not arbitrary substitutes, but
surrogates for substantively rational decision-making that are
themselves arrived at by substantively rational means.
If, for example, we take the testator's intent as a standard of
wills adjudication-it certainly fits Kennedy's definition of standards
as "substantive objectives of the legal order"5 -then the functional
analysis becomes an argument that the statutory formalities for wills
are representations that facilitate implementing the testator's intent
by substantively rational means. The formalities, although formally
rational in the Weberian sense, are thus, in effect, representations
of substantive rationality because of what they embody. The
advantage of defining wills by their formal attributes, rather than by
what evidence advances the standard of testamentary intent, is, of
course, that formalities can be applied mechanically, while standards
cannot.
' For a partial list of definitions with thumbnail sketches, see Schauer, supra note
7, at 510 & n.1.
55
See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1687-1713; Kennedy, Legal

Formality, supra note 4, at 354-77.
5 Kennedy, Legal Formality, supra note 4, at 358 (emphasis omitted).

5 For Weber's most concise statement of his taxonomy of decision-making in
adjudication and administration, see 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 653-58 (Guenther Ross & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978). For an accessible discussion of Weber's scheme, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
MAX WEBER 72-95 (1983).
' Kennedy, Form and Substance,supra note 4, at 1688. Whether we should grant
such a privileged status to the testamentary intent of dead people is a question of
political philosophy with which I am not concerned here. Others have been, however.
See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, CurtailingInherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 73 (1990)
(arguing that, as a general rule, "property rights should end at death"). I am simply

dealing with the reality that we say that we should.
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The routinizing value of formalities are well-known. As Weber
noted, "juridical formalism enables the legal system to operate like
a technically rational machine."59 The formal requirements for
wills enable probate to function as an administrative process rather
than ajudicial one in the crucial initial determination of whether or
not a writing is a will. They impose a standard form on testamentary writings that, for the vast majority of documents that comply with
it, relieves probate of the time-consuming and administratively
inefficient burden of conducting an individual inquiry into the
substantive issue of whether the decedent intended the document
to be a will.
Because "[s]ubstantively rational processes are
disorderly,"" the massive volume of probate business and the
inferior status of probate courts make such routinization essen61
tial.
The routinization of probate by means of the formalities,
however convenient or efficient, comes at a cost. Some wills are
found formally wanting, and therefore invalid, despite the conceded
clarity of their testamentary intent. One might argue that this is a
trifling cost, whether measured against the social utility of administrative efficiency or by the social acceptability of intestate succession, which assures that property will pass within the family when
wills fail. This would miss the point, however. Consider intestacy.
The statutory rules of intestate succession are default rules that
approximate what most testators do in their wills anyway-provide
for their immediate families.6 2 They represent legislative judgments of what people should do with their property. Intestacy thus
has a normative status, which is underscored by the fact that
remedial doctrines applied to wills to protect the testator's family,

9 2 WEBER, supra note 57, at 811.

6 Kennedy, Legal Formality, supra note 4, at 364.

61 For a more complete discussion of the relationship between the inferior status

of probate courts and the routinization of probate business, see Mann, supranote 18,
at 62-68. Schauer also notes that formalism "allocates power to some decisionmakers
and away from others . . . [and) therefore achieves its value when it is thought
desirable to narrow the decisional opportunities and the decisional range of a certain
class of decisionmakers." Schauer, supra note 7, at 544. Schauer develops this
argument at length in FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-66
(1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES].
62 Langbein discusses the "backstopping" effect of intestate distribution statutes.

See Langbein, supra note 1, at 499-501 (noting that the "backstopping" effect allows
rigid enforcement of formalities). For a good general discussion of default rules, see

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989).
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such as forced shares for the surviving spouse and pretermitted
children, operate by substituting some approximation of what the
protected parties would have received had their decedent died
intestate. Indeed, one occasionally glimpses a belief that intestacy
should have a privileged status, as when the Supreme Court of
California declared that "[i]n the absence of any will, the law makes
a wise, liberal, and beneficent distribution of the dead man's estate;
so wise, indeed, that the policy of permitting wills at all is often
gravely questioned.""
The presumptive fairness of intestate distribution is irrelevant,
however. If judges claim that the testator's intent is the standard,
and if in individual cases of formal noncompliance they concede
that the testator's intent is nonetheless clear, then to sacrifice the
individual case to the ideal of formal uniformity is, to the sacrificial
legatee, arbitrary, however just-or at least justifiable-it may be in
terms of administrative efficiency and however fair intestate
succession might be in general."
It is precisely because the consequence of formal insufficiencyintestacy-is so manifestly what a testator does not intend that the
attack on formalism in wills adjudication focuses so narrowly on
what is a will. Formalistic application of the formalities is, in effect,
the easy case. The attempt to leave a will, even if formally deficient,
is at least some evidence, and often considerable evidence, of the
underlying standard of testamentary intent. The "crystalline" nature
of the formalities, to borrow Carol Rose's imagery, 65 invites
"muddying up" by the failure of noncompliance to blot out all
evidence of the testator's intent. When that evidence remains,
however, it seems only fair to say that we should weigh it and give
effect to the testator's intent it proves.
It diminishes formalism, however, to regard it as simply the
mechanical application of a few formalities. If that were all there
were to it, the dispensing power of the new Uniform Probate Code
' In re Walker's Estate, 42 P. 815, 818 (Cal. 1895). The court modified its

opinion on rehearing by deleting the quoted sentence and a similar one. See In re
Walker's Estate, 42 P. 1082 (Cal. 1896) (per curiam). Some cases apply a presumption in favor of avoiding intestacy. See e.g., In re Silva's Estate, 145 P. 1015, 1016
(Cal. 1915) ("A will is always to be interpreted so as to prevent intestacy if such
interpretation is reasonably possible."); In re Buechley's Estate, 128 A. 730, 731 (Pa.
1925) ("[A] construction [of a will] should be adopted that avoids intestacy.").
" On the arbitrariness of rule application, see Kennedy,LegalFormalitysupranote

4, at 364.
' See Rose, supra note 8, at 577 (referring to the "hard-edged rules" of property
law as "crystals").
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would eliminate formalism from wills adjudication entirely and the
"problem" of formalism, if such it is, would be solved. If, however,
we take a broader view and define formalism as the mechanical
application of rules or, broader yet, as decision-making according to
rule without regard for the individual case, then we can see that
formalism flourishes even in the revised Code.
It clearly flourishes in intestate succession. The new availability
of the dispensing power to remove formalistic obstacles to the
testator's intent underscores the absence of any similar dispensation
in intestacy, where the default rules remain as invariable as the
formal requirements themselves were.
The rules of intestate
succession are "untailored" default rules that supply a single, off-therack standard to all intestate estates.66 One size fits all, even if
evidence of the decedent's preference for a different size exists that
is as persuasive as evidence of the testator's intent now permitted
under § 2-503. 67 There are compelling administrative reasons why
this should be so. For example, what a decedent intended is harder
to prove when there is no written document to narrow the inquiry.
Moreover, the possibility of an individual inquiry into the dispositional wishes of everyone who dies is a bureaucratic nightmare.
Compelling or not, the fact remains that while the formalism of
wills formalities and the formalism of the default rules once
presented a curious, but nonetheless real, kind of symmetry between
testacy and intestacy, they no longer do. The resulting imbalance
underscores the essential formalism of the rules of intestate
succession.
That formalism is not diminished by the continued tinkering
with the rules, making them ever more precise, such as the fine
distinctions that now determine the intestate share of a surviving
spouse.6 8 To be sure, ever-more-specific rules may approximate
standards and thus produce more "just"results in individual cases.
As long as their application is invariable, however, they remain

" On the distinction between "tailored" and "untailored" default rules, see Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 62, at 91-93.
' This would be the case if, for example, the decedent had left a tape-recorded
or videotaped "will," neither of which, although perhaps highly indicative of the
decedent's intent, are admissible to probate as a will, nor would their existence would
not alter the pattern of intestate distribution either.
68 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (1990); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights
in Our Multiple-MarriageSociety: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR.J. 683, 701-14 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of Uniform Probate
Code § 2-102).
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rules, formalistically applied. 9 Moreover, default rules necessarily
have a certain disembodied quality, which stems from their
justification in terms of presumed general or majoritarian intent
rather than individual intent. The sense of disembodiment
increases when the justification changes, as it did between the 1969
and 1990 versions of the Uniform Probate Code.
The introductory comment to Part 1 of Article II of the 1969
Code-the part on intestate succession-states that "[t]he Code
attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to
disposition of his property at death, and for this purpose the
prevailing patterns in wills are useful in determining what the owner
who fails to execute a will would probably want." 0 For default
purposes, it certainly seems reasonable to infer that people who fail
to leave valid wills have the same dispositional intent as those who
do and construct the rules of intestate succession accordingly.
Testators overwhelmingly provide for their immediate families, and
so does intestate distribution." The 1990 revisions to the Uniform
69 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 61, at 82-84.
70 UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1969).
7' The limited empirical research that has been done on testation indicates that
testators typically give all of their property to their immediate family, usually the
survivingspouse, although not necessarily outright. See, e.g., CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL.,
INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 179-206 (1987)
(discussing how estate taxes, government social programs, and the women's
movement have impacted estate planning); MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY
AND INHERITANCE 125 (1970) (stating that "[njearly 90 per cent of the decedent
testators willed their entire estates to their spouses.., where the spouse was the only
survivor"); Olin L. Browder,Jr., Recent Patternsof Testate Succession in the UnitedStates
and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (1969) (noting that only six out of the 54
wills surveyed bequeathed anything to anyone besides the spouse and children);
Allison Dunham, The Method, Process,andFrequency of Wealth Transmissionat Death,30
U. CH. L. REv. 241, 252 (1963) (stating that where deceased was survived by spouse
and children, all the testators left everything to the spouse). The few attempts to
survey living property owners about their intestate preferences point to the same
conclusion. See Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L.
REv. 1041, 1082 (1978) (supporting the disbursement of most of the estate to the
spouse); Mary L. Fellows et al., PublicAttitudes About Property DistributionatDeath and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 319, 386-87
(concluding that modern intestacy statute should provide spouse with entire estate
in preference to other relatives);Joel R. Glucksman, Comment, IntestateSuccession in
New Jersey: Does It Conform to PopularExpectations?,12 COLuM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253,
278 (1976) (finding that 80% of"testators gave their entire estates to their spouses").
For a different approach to the problem, which nonetheless arrives at the same place,
see John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L. REv.
216, 235-36 (1981) (using sociobiological theory to explain the preference for giving
everything to spouses). Mary Ann Glendon ascribes the increasing inheritance rights
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Probate Code made only modest alterations in the details of
intestate succession, but the justification has changed. Rather than
invoke what the intestate decedent "would probably want," the
introductory comment now talks about "fine tuning the various
sections and bringing them into line with developing public
policy."7 2 To be sure, the rules do not lose their previous ties to
the inferred intent of the decedent simply because the drafters offer
a different justification. The change does, however, represent a
telling, albeit tacit and doubtless unintended, uncoupling of rule
and intent at the same time that the Code reattaches them when the
decedent leaves a will. That uncoupling makes application of the
rules of intestate succession formalistic-not bad, but formalistic.
The uncoupling of rule and intent also appears in the construction and application of wills, most clearly in provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code that apply contrary to the stated intent of
the testator. The most dramatic example is the elective share, which
gives surviving spouses a portion of their deceased spouses' estates
regardless of any directions in the will to the contrary. The
common law has, of course, always accepted the principle that
property-owning spouses should not be permitted to leave their
surviving partners penniless. Dower was at least a small palliative
for widows, who, because of the legal disabilities of married women,
could never hold title to any of the marital property in their own
names.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, American
legislatures began to replace the common-law estate of dower with
a statutory right in the widow-gender neutrality is a recent gloss-to
upset her husband's testamentary applecart, as it were, and to elect
to take a statutory share in place of whatever her husband had given

of the surviving spouse to "the gradual attenuation of legal bonds among family
members outside the conjugal unit of husband, wife, and children." MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 238 (1989).
7 Compare UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1990) with id. art. II, pt. 1
gen. cmt. (1969). Both comments refer to providing "suitable rules" for "the person
of modest means who relies on the estate plan provided by law." UNIF. PROB. CODE
art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1990); id. art. II, pt. 1 gen. cmt. (1969). This fig leaf of a
justification is inherently improbable in light of the finding of one empirical study in
which none of the respondents who did not have wills attributed their testamentary
nakedness to satisfaction with the intestate distribution statute of their state-most
(63.6%) cited laziness. Moreover, of the 70% of the respondents who said that they
knew how their estates would be distributed by intestacy, fewer than half (44.6%)
were even close. See Fellows et al., supranote 71, at 339-40. In the hierarchy of daily
activities, taking out the garbage is considerably more pressing than writing a will.
Small wonder, then, that most people die intestate.
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her by will. These state elective-share schemes attained varying
degrees of complexity in response to real or imagined attempts by
angry, misogynist, or simply indifferent husbands to evade the
statutory minimums. Although once dismissed-wrongly and a bit
cavalierly-as "a solution in search of a problem,""5 the elective
share has become in the current Uniform Probate Code an issue of
gender equality designed explicitly to implement the partnership
theory of marriage."4 As codified and revised in §§ 2-201 to 2-207,
the elective share is a complex set of rules that makes fine adjustments according to objective, formally ascertainable criteria-the
nature of the property, the form of its ownership, the date and form
of any transfer, the duration of the marriage, the relative wealth of
each spouse, and the like. The details, for our purposes, are
unimportant. What matters is that once the surviving spouse
decides to exercise the statutory right of election, the elective share
operates automatically to counter the testamentary intent of one
spouse to disinherit the other.
The formalism of the elective share is explicit in its disregard of
the testator's intent.
Formalism also inheres somewhat less
obviously, but still tellingly, in other remedial provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code that fill in gaps in a will by imputing a
particular intent to the testator. Rules are not formalistic only when
they apply in the face of a contrary intent. They are also formalistic
when they apply on the basis of a presumed intent that bears no
necessary relationship to the individual case at hand. The degree
of formalism may not be as great, but it is still worthy of the name.
Gaps can arise in wills for three reasons-the will fails to dispose
of all the testator's property, a beneficiary named in the will dies
before the testator, or property bequeathed in the will is no longer

" Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's NonbarrableShare: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. Cmi. L. REv. 681, 681 (1966); see also Elias Clark, The Recapture of

Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent
Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REV. 513, 514 (1970) (stating that the elective share
situation "arises with such infrequency as to render the problem of little practical
consequence").
74 See UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. (1990) (stating that the purpose
of revisions to elective-share law is to adopt the "contemporary view of marriage as
an economic partnership"); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 874 (increasing
spousal share of estate from one-third to one-half "bespeak[s] a policy to implement
the partnership theory of marriage"). For a full discussion of what became the
revised elective-share provisions of the current Uniform Probate Code, see John H.
Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL

PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987); Waggoner, supra note 68, at 715-51.
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in the estate when the testator dies. Statutory rules exist to fill each
of these gaps-intestate succession, antilapse, and ademption,
respectively. We have already seen the formalism of intestate
succession, which rests in part on the presumed intent of decedents
and in part on public policy. The formalism of antilapse and
ademption also rest on the presumed intent of decedents, but
whereas the presumed intent that underlies intestate succession is
derived by analogy from the actual intent of testators, the presumed
intent that underlies the other two is less demonstrable. This does
not make them wrong. It simply illustrates the separation of rule
and intent that defines formalism.
One of the many disabling consequences of death is that
beneficiaries that die before their testators lose their bequests,
which lapse and pass by default under a residuary clause or, if there
is none, by intestacy. Antilapse statutes remedy the supposed
"wrong" of this result by saving the bequests to certain dead
legatees and giving them instead to their descendants. In a world
of perfect estate planning, antilapse statutes would be unnecessarytestators would foresee all possibilities and draft their wills accordingly, or at the very least they would rush to amend their wills when
a beneficiary died. In the imperfect world of reality, antilapse
statutes stand ready to fill the gaps that inevitably intrude.7 5 How
they fill them rests on the assumption that if testators had thought
about the problem, they would have preferred that the bequest be
preserved for the benefit of the beneficiary's family, at least where
the beneficiary was a close relative of the testator."6 In point of
fact, however, antilapse statutes swing into action only when
testators never considered the problem at all. When testators do
not themselves make alternate gifts of bequests that fail, there is
little evidence as to whether they would prefer the bequests to lapse
or not.77 In any given case, it may be at least as likely that the

For good general discussions ofantilapse statutes, see Susan F. French, Antilapse
Statutes Are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprintfor Reform, 37 HAsTiNcS L.J. 335 (1985);
PatriciaJ. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring ConstructionProblems, 37 EMORY L.J. 323
(1988).
6
A bare majority ofantilapse statutes limit the class of protected beneficiaries to,
at most, the testator's grandparents and their issue. See French, supranote 75, at 34445, 375. This limitation to reasonably close relatives is similar to the limits of many
intestate succession statutes, beyond which the decedent's property escheats to the
state.
" Some writers invoke an "instinctive preference for representation among
descendants" and point to its centuries-deep origins in the common-law rules of
descent of real property. Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
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testator would have wanted one as the other. With the single
exception of NewJersey, however, courts do not inquire into what
testators would have wanted. 8 Instead, the only room for testators' actual intent is as a negative-antilapse statutes are rules of
construction that apply unless testators intend that they do not.
Although one could construct an antilapse statute that elicited an
approximation of testators' likely intent by a finely'contextualized
analysis of family relations and the overall estate plan, no state
has."9 Indeed, the revised antilapse provision of the Uniform
Probate Code, § 2-603, slightly increases the weight of evidence
necessary to prove a testator's intent that the antilapse statute not
apply."0
Antilapse statutes are thus default rules that apply

UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1101-02 &
nn.46, 48 (1992). However instinctive this preference might be when the lapsed
bequest is to a child or grandchild of the testator, it is not at all clear that the instinct
is as compelling when the lapsed bequest is to a collateral relative. See Lawrence H.
Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB.
L. REv. 891, 923-24 (1992); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 888 n.38.
78 In cases of potential lapse, courts in NewJersey look to extrinsic evidence, if
necessary, to determine the testator's "probable intent" as to what should be done
with the property. See In re Estate of Burke, 222 A.2d 273, 280 (N.J. 1966)
(determining intent based on "the entire will, competent extrinsic evidence, and
common human impulses"); In re Estate of Cook, 206 A.2d 865, 867 (N.J. 1965)
(stating that the court will consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 178 A.2d 185, 187-89 (N.J. 1962) (discussing the
"probable intent" doctrine).
" The Pennsylvania antilapse statute does take a small step in this direction by
assuming that a testator would not want to save a bequest to a brother or sister, or
to a niece or nephew, if the consequence of letting it lapse would be that property
would pass to the testator's own spouse or issue. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2514(9) (1975). Susan French has proposed an antilapse statute that does take into
account the testator's family relations and overall estate plan. See French, supra note
75, at 371-73 (detailing the provisions of the proposed statute).
" Antilapse statutes are rules of construction that do not apply when the testator
has expressed a contrary intent. Many estate planners attach words of survival to
bequests in the apparent belief that they will automatically bar application of the
antilapse statute to save the bequest. The efficacy of the words of survival, however,
is open to question, given the amount of litigation over them. The revised Code
states expressly that "words of survivorship, such as in a devise to an individual 'if he
survives me,' or in a devise to 'my surviving children,' are not, in the absence of
additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent contrary to the application of
this section." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3) (1990). Some commentators have
sharply criticized this change. See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code:
Older and Better,orMore Like the InternalRevenue Code?,77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 649-57
(1993) (expressing "strong reservations" about the changes in the antilapse
provisions); Martin D. Begleiter, Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the
MalpracticeRevolution, 59 TENN. L. REv. 101, 126-30 (1991) (arguing that the new
antilapse provisions will increase the likelihood of malpractice litigation). Others, of
course, disagree. See Mary L. Fellows, Traveling the Road of ProbateReform: Finding
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mechanically with little or no regard for what individual testators
might have intended. Weak formalism, perhaps, but still formalism.
Traditionally, if a testator dies no longer owning property that
he or she has specifically devised in the will, the bequest is
adeemed-the beneficiary takes nothing."' Whether or not the
testator intended that result is irrelevant. At first glance, and, for
some, at subsequent glances as well, this seems to be an intuitively
obvious result-how can a beneficiary take a bequest of something
that the testator no longer owned? Rules, of course, cry out for
exceptions when confronted with sympathetic or ingeniously argued
cases. What if the specifically devised property was destroyed in the
accident that killed the testator, but there are insurance proceeds to
be distributed? What if the testator had sold a specifically devised
item and replaced it with a newer or older or cheaper or more
expensive version, or with something else entirely? What if it was
not the testator who sold the specifically devised property, but a
guardian or conservator?
Barred from considering extrinsic
evidence of the testator's intent, courts nonetheless fashioned
various escape devices to avoid ademption-saying that a bequest is
not specific and therefore not adeemed, or that mere changes in
form do not trigger ademption, or that wills "speak" only upon the
testator's death and pass whatever items approximate those present
when the will was executed. 2 The escape devices softened the
supposedly "harsh" formalism of the identity theory of ademption,
although not by referring to the intent of the individual testator

the Way to Your Will (A Response to ProfessorAscher), 77 MINN. L. REv. 659, 674-80

(1993) (criticizing Ascher's view of survivorship language); Halbach & Waggoner,
supra note 77, at 1104-15 (arguing that "the insertion of words of survivorship [into
a will] provides neither objective evidence that a conversation about the antilapse
statute took place nor even objective evidence that the client was put on notice to
think seriously about the possibility of nonsurvival"). However, on the "anti-formalist"
side of the scales, the revised Code also admits extrinsic evidence to rebut the rules
of construction. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-601 cmt. (1990). In any event, it is hard
to quarrel with the reason behind the change, which is to force lawyers to discuss the
possibility of lapse directly with their clients and determine what each client would
want done if beneficiaries died in the wrong order. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra
note 77, at 1102-04, 1109-15.
8" Strictly speaking, it is adeemed by extinction. Ademption by satisfaction is
another, less odorous, kettle of fish. On ademption generally, see THOMAS E.
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 134 (2d ed. 1953).

82 For discussions of classification and the change-in-form and time-of-death
constructions, see Gregory S. Alexander, Ademption and the Domain of Formality in
Wills Law, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1067, 1073-75 (1992). When a bequest is not adeemed,
the legatee receives its value or the object that replaced it.
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whose bequest it was-an intent that, after all, the testator had left
unexpressed and, perhaps, unformed. Ademption, itself a gapfilling remedy, thus spawned its own remedial devices.
The Uniform Probate Code before 1990 accepted the traditional
rule, modified by four limited exceptions."5 The ademption rule
of the revised Code, § 2-606, changes field entirely. The formal
default rule now provides that specific bequests are not adeemed
"unless the facts and circumstances indicate that ademption of the
devise was intended by the testator or ademption of the devise 8is4
consistent with the testator's manifested plan of distribution."
Commentators refer to this as "the intent-serving nonademption
rule,"8 5 and the comment to § 2-606 proclaims that "[t]he major
import of the revisions of this section is to adopt the 'intent'
theory." 6 Yet the initial default rule is every bit as formalistic as
the one it replaced. Both rest on the presumed intent of the
testator, but it is a suppositious intent with no empirical foundation.
There is no particular reason to believe that one position comports
with the intent of most testators any better than the other, although
that has not stopped commentators from arguing the point.8 " This
disjunction between rule and intent should not obscure the fact that
the revised rules of ademption are, on the whole, less formalistic
than before. It is worth noting, however, that even attempts to
weaken formalism in the law of wills must accept formalistic default
rules as the starting points from which they vary.

0 See UNiF. PROB. CODE § 2-608 (1969). The exceptions covered situations where
the specifically devised property had been sold before the testator's death and part
of the purchase price remained unpaid, where the property had been taken by
government action and a condemnation award was due, where there were fire or
casualty insurance proceeds on the property, and where the testator had received
property upon or in lieu of foreclosure of the security for a specifically devised
obligation.
84 UNIF. PROB.

CODE

§ 2-606(a)(6) (1990).

' Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 874.
86

UNIF. PROB. CODE

§ 2-606 cmt. (1990).

" Compare Alexander, supra note 82, at 1068, 1089 (stating that the identity
theory, which would adeem by extinction any specific devise that is not part of the
estate at death, is not consistent with testators' expectations) and Fellows, supra note
80, at 672 (arguing that a specific bequest does not necessarily indicate "that the
testator intended to embrace the identity theory") with Ascher, supranote 80, at 644
(arguing that a "specific bequest generally reflects a testator's wish that a particular
item pass to a particular individual").
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III. FORMALISM: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE INDIFFERENT
When critics attack formalism in the law of wills, they tacitly
distinguish between "good" formalism and "bad" formalism. "Bad"
formalism frustrates a testator's benign intent. It is the "punctiliousness that produces injustice"88 of strict compliance with the
formalities of execution. Critics never discuss, let alone attack, the
"good" formalism that frustrates the testator's intent when public
policy identifies the intent as malign, as when testators attempt to
disinherit their wives or husbands. Yet, both involve the mechanical
application of rules to produce results that are contrary to what the
testator intended. If formalism is objectionable in the one case, it
should also be objectionable in the other-unless, of course,
formalism is not the problem at all.
The formalism of the Wills Act formalities is, for want of a
better description, a kind of procedural formalism. It serves a gatekeeping function by governing the initial determination of whether
people die testate or intestate. It purports to be value neutral in
that it directs judges to apply the formal criteria objectively without
being swayed by how their decisions will affect individual legatees
and heirs. Substantive consequences are merely incidental to the
formal decisions and not at all constituted by them. The fallacy of
this is what prompts criticism. Judges, who are bound by the
formalism of the formalities, nonetheless often let the individual
case intrude, as when they bend the formalities for a sympathetic
legatee who would otherwise lose out or refuse to bend them for an
equally sympathetic legatee who has intestate succession as a
fallback. Commentators, who are not so bound, ask openly why the
individual case should not intrude when there is strong evidence of
the testator's intent. When testators attempt to contract around the
default rules of intestacy, why should they be prevented from doing
so by the formalistic application of rules that are meant to assist
them? Formalism of the formalities is thus "bad" because its
purported neutrality sweeps too broadly, making no distinction
between near misses and thorough failures.
The formalism of rules such as the elective share is, by way of
contrast, a formalism of substance, in which the rule exists to
further a specific social end. There is no pretense of neutrality.
Indeed, one imagines elective-share statutes wearing their frustration of the testator's intent proudly. Most elective-share provisions

11 Mann, supra note 18, at 68. Mea culpa.
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operate rather bluntly, but the revised Uniform Probate Code
individualizes the remedy by factoring in the length of the marriage
and the amount of property owned by the surviving spouse-in
short, by refining the formal rule. The elective-share rule operates
mechanically, but its particularity and the laudability of its end
combine to make the formalism of it and similar remedial rules
"good" formalism. That said, one never sees it discussed as such,
or even described as formalistic at all. Perhaps, when the rule is
itself the reform, categorization seems churlish.
Then there is the formalism, however weak, of other remedial
rules, such as antilapse and ademption. If we characterize formalism by our approval or disapproval of what it accomplishes, the
formalism of these rules is "indifferent" formalism. The default
rules in antilapse and ademption have no particular social utility.
They do not.raise issues of fairness orjustice. Indeed, there is little
reason why anyone should care whether or not bequests lapse or are
adeemed, unless, of course, one stands to gain or lose by the
decision. The gaps that antilapse and ademption rules fill must be
filled somehow, but when the89social stakes are so low, one rule is
probably as good as another.
The key to understanding these widely divergent reactions may
lie in the inherent conservatism of formalism. "Rules force the
future into the categories of the past," as one scholar observed."
They confine the discretion of judges and other decision-makers
within predetermined bounds by limiting what is relevant to what
has been deemed relevant before. What such rule-bound decisionand adaptability, it gains in stability,
making sacrifices in flexibility
91
certainty, and predictability.
The Wills Act formalities are stereotypical "categories of the
past," 2 as their provenance makes so clear. The formalistic
requirement of strict compliance prevents courts from reconsidering
the continued relevance of the categories and from recognizing that
formalities can lose their substantive meaning, as attestation has.
This failure mattered little when there were no alternatives to wills
for property owners who wanted to control the disposition of their
89 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606 cmt. (1990) (stating that the presumption
against ademption is only a "mild" one).
9o Schauer, supra note 7, at 542.
"' For a good discussion of the stabilizing effects of limiting decision-making
authority, see id. at 538-44; see also SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLES, supra note 61,
at 137-45.
2 Schauer, supra note 7, at 542.
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property at death, but who did not have enough surplus wealth to
create trusts while they were alive. The law of wills could thus
persist in its formalistic splendor as the sole unchallenged alternative to intestacy.
It is significant that criticism of wills formalism arose only when
other devices for passing property at death began to challenge the
monopoly of wills. Will substitutes such as life insurance, pension
accounts, joint accounts, and revocable trusts were the subject of
extensive litigation in the 1930s as courts and commentators
debated whether they should be struck down for their failure to
comply with the formalities required for wills.1 When the market
accepted will substitutes, they became the future that rules could
not force into the categories of the past. Their growing popularity,
fueled in part by dissatisfaction with the inefficiency and expense of
the probate process, became a standing reproach to formalistic
adherence4 to the Wills Act formalities, which critics never failed to
mention.

It thus became a goal of some probate reformers to reconcile
the law of wills and the law of will substitutes. Their progress was
fitful. Philip Mechem denounced the wills provisions of the Model
Probate Code in 1948 as "almost incredibly reactionary, unimaginative, and timid."9 5 A generation later, in 1969, the drafters of the
96
Uniform Probate Code reduced the formalities "to a minimum,"
as they believed, with the stated purpose that "[i]f the will is to be
restored to its role as the major instrument for disposition of wealth
at death, its execution must be kept simple" 9 --sidestepping the
9
See, e.g., Orville F. Grahame, The InsuranceTrust as Non-TestamentatyDisposition,
MINN.
L. REV. 391, 391-410 (1934); Guy B. Horton, The Testamentay Nature of
18
Settlements ofLife InsuranceElected by the Beneficiay, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 72,73-97 (1931);
C.W. Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 626, 626-38
(1930); Elmer I. Phillips, The Testamentay Characterof PersonalUnfunded Life Insurance
Trusts, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 700, 703-31 (1934); Austin W. Scott, Trusts and the Statute of
Wills, 43 HARV. L. REV. 521, 544-53 (1930); Charles D. Seftenberg, The BorderLines
of Agency, Living Trusts, and Testamentary Disposition, 5 WIS. L. REV. 321, 337-39
(1930). The first major criticism of formalism in wills drew heavily on the problems
of classification presented by will substitutes. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10.
94 See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 10, at 18-39; John H. Langbein, The
Nonprobate Revolution and the Futureof the Law of Succession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108,
1115-25 (1984); Langbein, supra note 1, at 503-09;John H. Langbein, The TwentiethCentuy Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,86 MICH. L. REV. 722,746-50 (1988);
Lindgren, supra note 18, at 556-57.
' Mechem, supra note 10, at 501.

96
97 UNIF. PROB. CODE

§ 2-502 cmt. (1969).

1d. art. ii, pt. 5 gen. cmt. (1969).

1994]

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

1061

question of why wills should be restored to predominance at all."
The 1990 Code, on the other hand, "accepts the inevitability of the
will substitutes and attempts to deal with the consequences. " 99 The
drafters identify the proliferation of will substitutes as one of the
three sea changes addressed by the revised Code-changes in gender
relations and a general decline of formalism in private law are the
other two-and announce their intent "to bring the law of probate
10 0
and nonprobate transfers into greater unison."
Against this background, it should be clear that it is not the
"intent-defeating" power of formalism that prompts reform. Rather,
it is the need to fashion new categories for the future. "Intentdefeating" formalism has its value, as the progressive refinement of
elective-share statutes attests. Formalism, even intent-defeating
formalism, is intrinsically neither "good" nor "bad." It is not von
Jhering's "anguished, pedantic cult of symbols wholly worthless and
meaningless in themselves," not even when applied to the Wills Act
formalities.' 0 1 Nor is it Weinrib's "effort to make sense of the
lawyer's perception of an intelligible order,"'0 2 unless one ascribes
intelligibility to the choice of default rules in antilapse and ademption. And it is not necessarily Schauer's "extreme and therefore
unfortunate manifestation of a fundamentally desirable characteristic,"108 at least not when it is the agent of particular policies of
what testators should do with their property. Instead, its character
derives from our judgment of what it accomplishes.
That judgment rests not so much on the strength or weakness
of commitment to formalism in the abstract as it does on a belief
that decisions about rules should not become too far removed from
their political, economic, or social context-or, as Schauer phrased
it, "formalism... still has the burden of showing that it is appropriately used in a particular decisional domain.""0 4 Formalism of the
Wills Act formalities is hard pressed to sustain that burden in the
face of will substitutes, which transmit more wealth, more efficient' In fairness, it should be noted that the drafters of the 1969 Code devoted most
of their energies to reforming probate procedure in an attempt to correct at least
some of the features that had driven people to avoid probate. See Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 2, at 871-72.
7
9Id. at 8 5.
,0o01 UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II prefatory note (1990).
1 VON JHERING, supra note 5.
102Weinrib, supra note 6, at 951.
103 Schauer, supra note 7, at 548.
1'4 Id. at 544.
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ly, with fewer formalities. Formalism of the default rules of
intestate succession or of the elective share, on the other hand,
carry the burden by their congruence with prevailing views of the
responsibility of property owners to their families.
When the categories of the past can no longer accommodate the
present, they must eventually change or be abandoned-hence the
dispensing power of § 2-503 and the refinements of intestate
succession and the elective share. The revised Uniform Probate
Code is thus not about "the fall of formalism" 1 5 or "curing intentdefeating formalism."0 6 It is about moving the law of wills into
the future-a task for which formalism is sometimes useful, and
sometimes not.

103Lindgren,

supra note 3, at 1009.

106Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 2, at 874.

